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The global consensus to treat multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) as separate entities for 
tax purposes requires them to act at arm’s 
length in the transfer of goods and services, 
especially setting the prices of such transfers. 
This means that, although in practice they are 
integrated entities under the ownership and 
control of a parent company, operating through 
a central management and vertical organisational 
structure, they must produce accounts in each 
country based on the fiction that they transact 
as independent entities would when transferring 
goods and services between associated 
enterprises. This arm’s length standard was 
established over eight decades ago and embodied 
in article 9 of the model tax treaties. It remains 
the global standard for the treatment of MNEs. 
To achieve the arm’s length treatment of 
MNEs, five methods have been approved by 
supranational bodies such as the OECD and 
the UN to guide tax authorities in arriving at a 
price for the transfer of goods and services, 
that would be deemed to be arm’s length. 
For all five methods, the taxpayer must 
include comparables in justifying the arm’s 
length standard, that is, that the price fixed, 
or the profit declared is the same as would 
be achieved by unrelated parties dealing 
with each other under similar conditions and 
terms. Comparability is fundamental to the 
application of the arm’s length principle since 
the application of the arm’s length standard is 
based on the comparison of the conditions in 
the controlled transaction with the conditions in 
comparable uncontrolled transactions.
As has come to be globally recognised, the 
implementation of the arm’s length standard and 
application of the transfer pricing methods are 
limited by the absence of reliable comparables 
to benchmark prices and terms fixed by related 
entities in their transactions. Also, there is the 
issue of capacity amongst tax authorities, coupled 
with the resource-intensive, time-consuming 
and complex nature of the process. 
To ameliorate the limitations of the transfer 
pricing methodologies, some jurisdictions adopt 
simplified measures, which though diverging 
from the five approved OECD methods, 
arguably achieve a price which supposedly 
independent entities may have arrived at. 
A safe harbor regime is one such measure. 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TPGs) 
define safe harbours as a provision that 
applies to a defined category of taxpayers or 
transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers 
from certain obligations otherwise imposed by a 
country’s general transfer pricing rules. This 
brief explores the adoption and application of 
safe harbours by African tax jurisdictions. 
Pros and cons of safe harbour 
regimes
The 2017 OECD TPGs recommend the use of 
safe harbour regimes to avoid the difficulties of 
applying the arm’s length principle, by creating a 
regime where eligible taxpayers may elect to follow 
simplified transfer pricing rules or are exempt 
from the application of transfer pricing rules.1 
The 2017 TPGs lists the benefits of safe 
harbours to include: compliance relief; tax 
certainty; and administrative simplicity. On 
tax certainty, safe harbours guarantee the 
acceptance of returns filed by taxpayers where 
the returns are within the prescribed margins 
or the taxpayer applies the recommended 
transfer pricing methods. This guarantee of 
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acceptance reduces the compliance burden 
on taxpayers, relieving them from potential 
further audits and reassessment of their tax 
returns. For the tax authority, the cost and the 
burden of administration of the tax system are 
reduced, encouraging voluntary compliance 
by the taxpayer, which is less problematic and 
uncertain than compliance with the full transfer 
pricing process. Other benefits of a safe harbor 
regime are reduction in the need to find data on 
comparables and the requirement to perform a 
benchmarking study in every case. 
There are potential dangers of a safe harbor 
regime. First, a safe harbor regime may not 
comply with the arm’s length standard. The 
central reason for this is that where the safe 
harbour prescribes a transfer pricing method 
to be used by a specified group of taxpayers, 
it may fail to consider the unique facts and 
circumstances of each of the taxpayers covered. 
As such, the prescribed transfer pricing method 
may not be appropriate for all taxpayers. 
Second, a safe harbour regime may cause 
double taxation. This is especially the case 
where a tax jurisdiction unilaterally implements 
a safe harbour regime. Unilateral safe harbours 
are problematic because countries are not 
bound to accept tax returns made by a related 
entity to a different tax jurisdiction or the transfer 
pricing adjustment made by such other tax 
authority. In the absence of corresponding 
adjustment, the potential for double taxation 
is present. Other potential dangers of a safe 
harbour regime include, creation of avenues for 
tax planning, and equity and uniformity issues 
as a result of a distinct set of rules created by 
the safe harbour regime. 
Types of safe harbours
Safe harbours are commonly applied to 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and 
small transactions. They may exempt eligible 
taxpayers from applying transfer pricing rules 
to transactions with related entities or exempt 
eligible taxpayers from preparing transfer 
pricing documentation. These taxpayers and 
transactions are viewed as carrying low tax 
risk and do not contribute significantly to the 
revenue collection of these tax jurisdictions, 
though they cause significant compliance and 
enforcement burdens on taxpayers and tax 
authorities, respectively. 
For rich countries, reduction in compliance, 
and enforcement costs and burden guide the 
introduction of safe harbour regimes in their tax 
jurisdictions. For African countries, increasing 
and guaranteeing corporate income tax 
collection is equally important. This additional 
policy objective informs the recommendation 
for safe harbours to be applied to high 
value-adding industries and large taxpayers 
by African tax jurisdictions. Also, it is the case 
in Africa (as elsewhere) that most SMEs do 
not come under the transfer pricing rules and 
practices of countries. The transfer pricing 
rules apply only to companies which are part of 
an MNE group and are involved in cross-border 
transactions with affiliates. Most SMEs in 
Africa are not affiliates of multinational groups, 
neither are they engaged in cross-border 
intra-firm transactions, and as such are not 
subject to transfer pricing rules and practices 
of the tax jurisdictions. This explains why in 
some tax jurisdictions the transfer pricing unit 
or international tax department is located under 
the Large Taxpayers Office.
Effective design of safe 
harbour regimes
African tax authorities desirous of adopting safe 
harbour regimes must strive to achieve safe 
harbour price range or rates that approximate 
to the arm’s length price that would be achieved 
using the transfer pricing methods. They must be 
aware of the potential tax-planning opportunities 
from the application of safe harbour regimes. 
Also, given the potential discrimination against 
other sectors or taxpayers, safe harbour 
regimes must be justifiable for selected sectors. 
In addition, the potential for double taxation 
must be addressed when establishing a safe 
harbour regime. While bilateral and multilateral 
safe harbour regimes are recommended, a 
carefully designed unilateral safe harbour 
regime may achieve the benefits of safe 
harbours without causing double taxation.
Furthermore, given the revenue demands 
of African countries and the paucity of 
comparables for benchmarking purpose, it is 
recommended that safe harbour regimes be 
introduced to high value-adding sectors of the 
economy and to large taxpayers. This also 
justifies the political will needed to negotiate 
bilateral or multilateral safe harbour regimes.
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